ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
Economists are increasingly interested in the impact of institutions on economic development. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) , Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that high quality institutions in a country, represented by a number of dimensions such as the protection of property rights and a functioning democracy, foster economic development because they promote investment in human capital and physical capital. Countries that are governed by high quality institutions experience higher capital accumulation, productivity, and output per worker (Hall and Jones 1999) . Rodrik (1999) shows that the extent of democracy in a country has a positive impact on wages received by manufacturing workers. Barro (1996) argues that a more democratic regime stimulates economic growth when the level of political freedom is low.
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The potential impact of economic development on the extent of democracy is an equally important research question, and whether an increase in income of a country causes its democracy to improve has been a subject of recent debate. As widely quoted in this literature, a common perspective, articulated by Lipset (1959) is that "From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics an could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues." Barro (1999) finds that the propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP. Minier (2001) shows that an increase in per capita GDP is associated with an enhanced demand for democracy, approximated by pro-democracy public demonstrations. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) report that economic development is a key factor determining the intensity of democratic reforms in a country. On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2008) find no significant impact of GDP growth on democratization.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the determinants of democracy.
However, it differs from the previous work in an important way. It employs individuallevel, rather than country-level data. The paper investigates the extent to which an individual's own joblessness and the unemployment rate of his/her country make him/her more likely to reveal a distaste towards the effectiveness of democracy. argue that regime changes are more likely during recessionary periods; and Haggard and Kaufman (1995) point out that many Latin American transitions to democracy coincided with economic crises. The implication is that short-term economic downturns may prompt reactions towards the existing regime. While it is sensible to think that undesirable economic conditions would trigger enhanced opposition movements against existing undemocratic regimes, it is equally reasonable to argue that tough economic conditions in a democratic regime could prompt negative feelings towards democracy. For example, Gasiorowski (1995) and Prezworski et al. (1996) demonstrate that recessions significantly increase the probability of a coup. Because of the free-rider problem, a change in perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy among the residents of a country does not necessarily imply involvement in direct actions against democracy, such as participation in a revolt (MacCulloch 2005) . Nevertheless, it is important to understand how perceptions about democracy are impacted by personal economic conditions as these perceptions may translate into political actions against democracy in subtle ways such as voting for a political party which has an explicit or implicit anti-democratic platform.
We use micro data on 131,615 individuals from 69 countries to investigate the extent to which personal joblessness of individuals and the unemployment rate in their country impact their perceptions of operational efficiency of democracy. We find that observationally identical individuals have weaker beliefs about democratic efficiency if they are jobless and if duration of joblessness is longer than one year. The same is true if the unemployment rate of the country goes up and if these individuals live in countries with low levels of democracy. These results underline the importance of labor market policies in developing countries with struggling democracies. We also find that higher household income and personal education promote stronger perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy. Section II describes the empirical specification and the data. Section III presents the results and Section IV is the conclusion.
II. Empirical Specification
The basic model can be specified as follows:
( Equation (1) is normally distributed, then the result is a standard single-equation probit specification.
We employ three different variables to represent D ict to capture the beliefs about the effectiveness of democracy. The first measure is an indicator of the extent to which the individual believes that the economic system runs badly in democracies. The second one gauges general effectiveness of democracy as a political decision-making system. It measures whether the individual believes that democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling. The third one measures the preference of the individual towards a leader who does not bother with key aspects of a democracy such as the parliament and elections. The details of these variables are described in the data section below.
The specification depicted by Equation (1) is similar in spirit to a line of research conducted by political scientists and economists to explain the voting patterns and to forecast election results. For example, Kramer (1971) , Stigler (1973 ), Fair (1978 analyzed the impact of economic conditions on the percentage of votes received by incumbent and opposition parties in the U.S. Presidential or Congressional elections. Markus (1988) and Nannestad and Paldam (1997) analyzed the propensity to vote for the incumbent as a function of personal economic circumstances and aggregate macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and in Denmark, respectively. Garand and Ulrich (2009) (Clark and Oswald 1994 , Clark 2003 , Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998 .
Therefore, an increase in the unemployment rate may alter attitudes towards democracy through its direct impact on utility.
Differences across individuals with respect to their general attitudes towards democracy are represented by α ict in Equation (1), where larger values indicate higher baseline propensity for dissatisfaction with democracy. Note that α has a subscript c indicating that the extent of unhappiness with democracy may vary between countries. This could be because of cultural, historical and institutional differences between countries. Also note that α has subscript i, indicating that predisposition to dissatisfaction with democracy may vary between people who live in the same country. This could be because of differences in family background and personal characteristics. We discuss potential empirical issues, and threats to identification in the results section.
Specifically, we address potential reverse causality and a potential for a spurious relationship between joblessness and perceptions about democratic efficiency.
In Equation (1) Regressions also include the Human Development Index created by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and the standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity US dollars.
We control for the share of military expenditures in GDP to account for the differences in the government policies between more democratic and less democratic regimes. Specifically, if governments in countries with low levels of democracy require more suppressive mechanism to be able to keep competitors out of office, and such The unemployment rate of the country is obtained mainly from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The other source of the unemployment rate is the International Labour Organization's KILM database. If the unemployment rate is not available for one country at a specific year through WDI, it is imputed by assigning either the most recent year's unemployment or the average of the closest years' unemployment rates for that country in WDI. If neither of the imputation methods work (such as in the cases when there was no recent years' unemployment rates for a country or no data was available in WDI), then the unemployment rate from KILM database is employed.
For each country we also have data on the level of democracy. This variable, obtained from Polity IV 5 , measures various aspects of democracy in the country including competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints and limitations on chief executive's authority. The democracy index ranges from -10 to 10, where a higher value represents a better-functioning democracy. 6 The means and standard deviations of country characteristics are calculated by considering each countryyear as one observation. Table 2 displays the marginal effect obtained from estimation of Equation (1) using probit. Standard errors, that are corrected for arbitrary covariance structure and that are adjusted for clustering within a country in a specific year, are reported in parentheses.
III. Results
Regressions also include time dummies to control for the fact that different countries are surveyed in different years, and continent fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics that may be common to the countries in the same broad geographic area.
Column (1) reports the results of the model where the dependent variable is whether the respondent believes that democracy is bad for the economy. The second column displays the results of the models where the dependent variables are whether the respondent believes that democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling. The third column pertains 5 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 6 The data on democracy variable were not available for some countries for some years from the source. The democracy variable is completed by assigning the closest year's democracy index value in that country or that of the previous governing country. For example, the democracy scores of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia in 1991 are assigned to Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czech Republic in 1990, respectively (and in 1991 for Czech Republic). Similarly, democracy index values for Russian Federation in 1992 and Slovakia in 1992 are assigned to the same countries in 1990 and 1991. to the model where the dependent variable indicates if the respondent believes that a strong leader who does not bother with the parliament and elections is good for the country.
Column (1) of Table 2 The same is true for the Human Development Index. The impacts of ever having been colonized and that of military spending are positive in column (1), although the coefficient is not significantly different in models displayed in columns 2 and 3. As will be discussed below, the impact of colonization on people's preferences for democracy will change direction if the models are estimated by the level of democracy of the country. As the proportion of people who are Protestant in the country goes up, the propensity for disapproval of the effectiveness of democracy goes down.
Political Misfits and Reverse Causality
Consistent with our expectations, β in Equation (1) Table 3 displays the results of the same specification with one difference. These results are obtained from the model which omits the country variables, but includes country fixed-effects instead. In this specification the coefficients of Jobless remain the same, but the impact of the country unemployment loses statistical significance and/or changes sign. We also estimated the models by excluding political misfits from the sample. That is, we analyzed the relationship between joblessness, unemployment rate and preferences for democracy in sample of individuals whose general feelings towards democracy are aligned with the society they live in. The results remained the same.
It is plausible that the impact of joblessness on the beliefs about the effectiveness of democracy is different in countries with low levels of democracy in comparison to countries with a high level of democracy. Therefore, we estimated the model separately for countries with low levels of democracy (Democracy<7) and for countries that have a high level of democracy (Democracy ≥7). The results are presented in Tables 4A and 4B . The specifications also include the indicator variable to identify if the respondent is a political misfit in his/her country.
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There are commonalities in the results that are obtained from countries with low and high-levels of democracy. For example, in both groups of countries joblessness of an individual has a negative influence on the feelings towards democratic efficiency. The impact is similar between the two group of countries. Although the marginal effect of joblessness is slightly larger in countries with high levels of democracy, so are the baselines in these countries. 9 Being divorced, separated from the spouse or being a widow is also correlated with having negative feelings toward democracy; and the same is true of being retired.
There are also interesting contrasts between the results obtained from the two groups of countries. The unemployment rate has a strong impact on the feelings toward democracy for people in countries where the level of democracy is low (Table 4A) , while the unemployment rate has no impact on people's feelings towards the effectiveness of democracy in countries where the level of democracy is high (Table 4B ). The former group consists of mostly, but not exclusively, of developing countries (see footnote 7), where the societies are collectivist, rather than individualistic (Mocan 2008) . Thus, an increase in the unemployment rate may have a direct impact on the utility of the individual based on otherregarding preferences. It could also be the case that an increase in the unemployment rate triggers a higher level of anxiety in these countries because an increase in the unemployment rate may be associated with a larger degree of uncertainty about the future of the labor market in these countries.
In the group of countries where democracy is higher, having ever been a colony has no impact on the extent of people's feelings towards democracy. On the other hand, among the group of countries with low levels of democracy, having been colonized in the past decreases the propensity to indicate that democracies are bad for the economy. In countries with low levels of democracy, the propensity to respond in the affirmative that democracies "Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?" A dichotomous variable, which takes the value of 1 is created if the respondent indicated that the country was run by a few big interests.
We ran probit models using these three indicators as dependent variables. We employed the same specifications as in Tables 2 and 3 , using the same samples. That is, we included individuals that were part of the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 and who also answered the three questions above. 10 The results are displayed in Table 5 . We ran two specifications for each question. Panel A displays the results which are based on the specification presented in Table 2 , and Panel B displays the results which include the variable which measures if the person is political misfit in his/her country. The coefficient of Joblessness is not different from zero in any specification in Table 5 . This indicates that the impact of being jobless on the beliefs about the effectiveness of democracy, displayed in Tables 2-4 , is not likely to be an artifact of a general displeasure towards government, but rather, it is targeted towards democracy.
Duration of Joblessness
It is possible that the impact of joblessness on the perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy changes by the duration of joblessness. That is, individuals' attitudes may depend on how long they have been without a job. To investigate if this is the case, we replace the variable Jobless with three mutually exclusive dummy variables: Jobless-Less than 6 months, Jobless 6 months to 1 year, and Jobless: More than 1 year. These variables identify whether the person was unemployed for less than six months, six months to a year, or more than one year, respectively. The information about the duration of joblessness was based on the following question: "For how long are you unemployed?" The responded could choose among six categories ranging from "less than half a year" to "more than two years".
This question was asked in 1999 in the overwhelming majority of cases, and it was asked only in European countries. Therefore, the sample used in this analysis is smaller and is not comparable to the sample used in previous analyses. 11 Nevertheless the results, displayed in Table 6 are informative, and they indicate that in the sample of Europeans, the duration of joblessness matters. More specifically, the perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy and the desire for a rouge leader impact of joblessness is driven by long-term unemployment. Short-term unemployment (less than six months) may be voluntary or frictional, which would not prompt negative feelings towards democracy. Table 6 shows that those who are unemployed for less than six months do not have systematically different perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy in comparison to those who have jobs.
The same is true for those who are unemployed for a period of six months to a year.
However, those who are unemployed for more than one year are significantly more likely to indicate that democracy is bad for the economy, that democracies are indecisive and involve too much quibbling, and that a rouge leader is preferable. Thus, the results obtained from When we employ alternative dependent variables such as whether the person has confidence in the government, whether the person is satisfied with the way people in the national office are handling the country's affairs, and whether the person believes that the country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, we find that joblessness has no impact on these opinions. This suggests that the impact of joblessness on negative perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy is not a reflection of a general disapproval of the government.
Given the research that indicates a strong impact of democratization and institutional quality on economic development, it is important to identify the determinants of democratization. The results of this paper suggest that the beliefs about the effectiveness of democracy as system of governance are shaped by personal joblessness experience of the individuals. This in turn implies that periods of high unemployment and joblessness could hinder the development of democracy, or threaten its existence. Numbers of non-missing observations for "Democracy is Bad for the Economy", "Democracies are Indecisive" and "A strong Leader can better manage the country" are 118,365, 120,739 and 131,615, respectively. For the rest of the variables, the number of non-missing observations range from 115,159 and 131,540 (except for controls misfit and preferences about democracy for which the numbers of non-missing observations is around 110,000). Sources of the variables used are presented below. If the unemployment rate was not available for one country at a specific year, it is imputed by using either the most recent year's unemployment rate or the average of the closest year's unemployment rate. If neither of the imputations work, then the unemployment rate from KILM database is employed. (G) Penn World tables 6.2 (H) World Bank's World Development Indicators (I) POLITY IV. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. The data on democracy variable were not available for some countries for some years from the source. The democracy variable is completed by assigning the closest year's democracy index value in that country or that of the previous governing country. See footnote 6 in the text for details. a: The descriptive statistics of the country level variables are calculated using each country-year as one observation. Notes -The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees to the statements "Democracy is Bad for the Economy," "Democracies are Indecisive" and "A strong leader can better manage the country," respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 . All regressions include year dummies as well as continent fixed effects. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the countryyear level. Notes -The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees to the statements "Democracy is Bad for the Economy," "Democracies are Indecisive" and "A strong Leader can better manage the country," respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 . All regressions include individual level variables, year dummies as well as continent fixed effects as in Table 2 . The models in Panel A and B include country characteristics and country fixed effects, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. Notes -The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees to the statements "Democracy is Bad for the Economy," "Democracies are Indecisive" and "A strong Leader can better manage the country," respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 and in the text. The sample consists of individuals from countries with a democracy index less than 7.All regressions include year dummies as well as continent fixed effects. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. Notes -The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees to the statements "Democracy is Bad for the Economy," "Democracies are Indecisive" and "A strong Leader can better manage the country," respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 and in the text. The sample consists of individuals from countries with a democracy index greater than or equal to 7. All regressions include year dummies as well as continent fixed effects. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. Notes -The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual indicates that he is fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs (column 1), if he/she does not have very much confidence or had no confidence in the government (column 2), and if he/she indicates that the country is run by a few big interests rather than the interests of all people (column 3). The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 and in the text. All regressions include individual level variables, year dummies as well as continent fixed effects as in Table 2 . The models in Panel A and B include country characteristics and country fixed effects, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. Notes -The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3 in each panel, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees to the statements "Democracy is Bad for the Economy," "Democracies are Indecisive" and "A strong leader can better manage the country," respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 . The sample used includes individuals from countries to which joblessness duration question is asked. The countries in the sample are Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and Great Britain. All regressions include year dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level.
